On new symbolic key exchange protocols and cryptosystems based on a hidden tame homomorphism
1. On Post Quantum and Multivariate Cryptography, public key schemes approach. Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) serves for the research of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, which can be potentially resistant against attacks based on the use of a quantum computer. Multivariate cryptography is one of the oldest directions of PQC. It uses, as security tools, a nonlinear polynomial transformations f of kind: 2 , …, x n ), x 2 → f 2 (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ), ..., x n → f n (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ) acting on the affine space K n , where f i , i = 1, 2, ..., n, from K[x 1 , x 2 , …, x k ] are multivariate polynomials given in a standard form, i. e. via a list of monomials in a chosen order (see [1] ).
The most popular form is the usage of a very special map f in a public key mode. It means the key holder Alice has some initial data D, which allow her to solve the equation f(x) = b, where b and x are known and unknown elements of the free module K n , but a public user Bob has only f given publicly in its standard form. Asymmetry means that Alice has tools for the encryption and decryption, but Bob has only an encryption procedure. Public knowledge on f = f n (allows the adversary to create as many pairs of kind plaintext p-ciphertext c = f(p) as he/she wants. It makes the problem of practical design of such a cryptosystem to be a difficult task. First examples were based on families of quadratical bijective transformations f n (see [1] [2] [3] ), such choice implies a rather fast encryption process.
In [4] , the idea of a multivariate Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol was modified in various ways. It uses recent constructions of large families of stable subsemigroups of small degree in affine Cremona semigroups containing large cyclic semigroups.
In Section 2, we introduce new cryptographical protocols with the usage of the concept of a tame homomorphism of stable semigroups of affine transformations (homomorphic map, which is computable in polynomial time). The idea to exploit the complexity of word problem for the Cremona semigroup about the decomposition of a given polynomial transformation g from the semigroup into given generators is presented in Section 3.
The multivariate nature of collision maps allows us to use these algorithms for the safe exchange of multivariate transformations. Various deformation rules can be used for this purpose (see Section 4) . Correspondents may use a family of invertible generators g n . Assume that one of them can generate the inverse of g n . Then the symbolic El Gamal type tahoma algorithms can be used by correspondents. They can use the inverse protocol to elaborate pairs of mutually invertible transformations. So, they can conduct the information exchange protected via the complexity of some difficult problem. Section 5 introduces the inverse of the group enveloped symbolic DiffieHellman algorithm described in [4, 5] .
The last section is devoted to the implementation of the algorithm of Section 3 via symbolic walks on graphs A(n, K) (see [6, 7] ).
In all realizations of algorithms, we use stable subsemigroups S of the affine Cremona semigroup S(K n ) generated by special symbolic automata defined in terms of special algebraic graphs. The method of generation allows us to construct, for each bijective transformation of S, its inverse element. In fact, we use linguistic graphs defined in [8] . They are bipartite graphs with a special coloring of vertices such that, for each vertex, there is a unique neighbor of the selected color. We did not use the terminology and general technique of symbolic walks on linguistic graphs. In fact, for each family of graphs considered in the paper, an algorithm of generation of the corresponding stable semigroup was given in independent way.
2. Tame families and concept of stability. Let us consider basic algebraic objects of multiva riate cryptography, which are important for the choice of appropriate pairs of maps f, f -1 in both cases of public key approach or idea of asymmetric algorithms with protected encryption rules. Let us consider the totality SF n (K) of all rules f of kind:
acting on the affine space K n , where f i , i = 1, 2, …, n, for the given parameter n and a chosen commutative ring K with the natural operation of composition. We refer to this semigroup as a semigroup of formal transformations SF n (K) of free module K n . In fact, it is a totality of all endo- 
is a totality of all transformations of kind t(f). The canonical homomorphism t: → t(f) maps the infinite semigroup SF n (K) onto a finite semigroup S(K n ) in the case of finite commutative ring K.
We refer to the pair (f, f ′) of elements SF n (K) such that ff ′and f ′f are two copies of the identical rule x i → x i , i = 1, 2, ..., n, as a pair of invertible elements. If (f, f ′) is such a pair, then the product t(f)}t(f ′) is an identity map. Let us consider the subgroup CF n (K) of all CF n (K)-inverti ble elements of SF n (K) (group of formal maps). It means f is an element of CF n (K) if and only if there is f ′ such that ff ′ and f ′f are identity maps. It is clear that the image of a restriction of t on CF n (K) is the affine Cremona group C n (K) of all transformations of K n onto K n , for which there exists a polynomial inverse. We say that a family, of subsemigroups S n of SF n (K) (or S(K n ) is stable of degree d, if the maximal degree of elements from S n is an independent constant d, d > 2. If K is a finite commutative ring, then stable semigroup has to be a finite set. The brief observation of the known families of stable groups can be found in [4, 5] (see also [9] [10] [11] [12] ). Let f n from SF n (K) be a family of nonlinear maps of degree bounded by constant d. We say that f n form a tame family, if there is a family g n from SF n (K) of degree bounded by constant d′ such that f n g n = g n f n are identity maps. Let T 1 and T 2 be two elements from the group AGL n (K) of all affine bijective transformations, i. e., elements of the affine Cremona group of degree 1. Then we refer to f ′ n = T 1 f n T 2 as linear deformation of f n . Obviously, f ′ n is also a tame family of transformations, and the degrees of maps from this family are also bounded by d. The degrees of inverses of f ′ n are bounded by d ′. Let G n < SF n (K) be a stable family of subgroups of degree d, d 2. Then the nonlinear representatives f n of G n form a tame family of maps.
3. On the concept of tame homomorphism and related algorithms. Let G = G n be a family of stable subsemigroups of SF n (K) (or S(K n )), and let L = L m , where m depends on n, be a family of stable subsemigroups of SF m (R) (or S(R m )), where K and R are commutative rings. There are tame homomorphisms φ = φ n from G into L, i. e. the value of φ at each point g from G n is computable in polynomial time from n. Let us assume that there are semigroups B = B n < G n given by their generators b 1 , b 2 , …, b r . Let us assume that Alice has families of tame transformations π 1 of K n and of π 2 of R m . We assume that these data are known to Alice. She forms (
), i = 1, 2, ..., r and sends them to Bob. The elements of these pairs are given in their standard forms for representatives of SF n (K) or SF m (R).
3.1. Key exchange protocol. The list of pairs known for Bob defines a homomorphism Δ between the subsemigroups A = 〈a 1 , a 2 , ..., a r 〉 and A′ = 〈a′ 1 , a′ 2 , , ..., a′ r 〉 given by its values on generators Δ (a i ) = Δ (a′ i ) for i = 1, 2, ..., r. Bob forms a via his choice of word
in the alphabet of generators of A such that a i s ≠ a i s+1 for s = 1, 2, ..., t-1. He sends a to Alice and keeps
… as a collision element. Alice knows the tame homomorphism φ and easily computes a′ as π 2 φ(π 1 -1
Complexity remark. The adversary has to solve the word problem for the subsemigroup A, i. e., find the decomposition of a from A into generators a 1 , i = 1, 2, ..., t. The general algorithm to solve this problem in polynomial time in the variable n is unknown, as well as a procedure to get its solution in terms of quantum computations. , i = 1, 2, coincide with G 1 and G 2 . We can take π 1 of kind T 1 n 1 and π 2 of kind T 2 n 2 , where π 1 of kind n i are elements of N i , i = 1, 2, transformations T 1 and T 2 are elements of groups AGL n (K) and AGLm(R) Then the degrees of a and Δ(a) are restricted by t 1 and t 2 .
Note that, in the case G = G 1 , L = G 2 , the degrees of a and Δ(a) are bounded by d and d′. We refer to the presented above algorithm as the tahoma word protocol. The term tahoma (name of shrift for word processing) stands for a tame homomorphism.
The protocol exploits the complexity of the word problem for a semigroup of polynomial transformation of a free module. In the case considered in Remark 2, we use the term stable tahoma word protocol.
3.2. Inverse tahoma word protocol. Let us modify protocol 3.1 in the case of invertible elements φ(a i ) with an assumption that their inverses are known to Alice. Instead of pairs ( A different usage of homomorphisms of a subsemigroup of the Cremona semigroup in the cryptosystem was considered in [13, 14] .
4. On the safe exchange of symbolic transformations. The symbolic nature of the collision map can be used for a task that differs from the exchange of keys. We refer to it as the usage of DH deformation symbolic rules.
Let Alice have a free module K n over a commutative ring K. She has a subset Ω of K n and a
Additionally, Alice has an algorithm to solve, in polynomial time, the equation x = b with respect to the unknown x from Ω and b from Ω. Alice and Bob use the tahoma word protocol or symbolic Diffie-Hellman protocol to elaborate the collision map g acting on K n . After this step, Alice sends Ω and the transformation h = f + g to Bob. Now Bob can get f as h-g. He writes a plaintext p from Ω and sends the ciphertext c = f(x). Alice uses her data for the decryption.
Remark 4. Note that a new algorithm is still asymmetric because Bob can encrypt, but not decrypt. The encryption rule is known a to trusted customer (Bob) but the adversary has no access to it. In fact, such access is protected by the word problem in a semigroup of transformations of K n or the discrete logarithm problem in the corresponding affine Cremona semigroup.
Other deformations. Alice and Bob agree (via the open channel) on a deformation rule D(f)
.., n, and g is the rule x i → g i (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, and Alice sends a tuple of polynomials f i g i , i = 1, 2, ..., n. Bob uses the division to restore f. Instead of the addition deformation rule (sending 
The last deformation is interesting, because, in many cases, we can achieve the equality of degrees for f and D(f). It is easy to continue this list of possible deformation rules. ). After that, the adversary has to find the inverse function for f like in the case of multivariate public key.
To prevent "transition to knowledge" of an encryption multivariate map, Alice (or Bob) can arrange a new session with the protocol and a transmission of a new deformed encryption rule, for which secret data for the decryption are known.
Remark 6. The technique of linearization attacks on nonbijective maps or maps f n of unbounded degree and a low density is not developed yet. We present briefly the protocol of symbolic computations introduced in [4] and define its inverse version. We refer to this protocol as the group enveloped Diffie-Hellman scheme and inverse group enveloped Diffie-Hellman scheme. [4] . Let K be a commutative ring. We define A(n, K) as a bipartite graph with the point set P = K n and a line set L = K n (two copies of a Cartesian power of K are used). We will use brackets and parentheses to distinguish tuples from P and L. So,
The incidence relation I = A(n, K) (or corresponding bipartite graph I) is given by the condition p I l if and only if the equations of the following kind hold:
Let us consider the case of finite commutative ring K, |K| = m. As it instantly follows from the definition, the order of our bipartite graph A(n, K) is 2m n . The graph is m-regular. In fact, the neighbour of a given point p is given by the above equations, where the parameters p 1 , p 2 , …, p n are fixed elements of the ring, and the symbols l 1 , l 2 , …, l n are variables. It is easy to see that the value for l 1 could be freely chosen. This choice uniformly establishes the values for l 2 , l 3 , …, l n . So, each point has precisely m neighbors. In a similar way, we observe the neighborhood of the line, which also contains m neighbors. We introduce the color ρ(p) of a point p and the color ρ(l) of a line l as parameters p 1 and l 1 respectively.
Graphs A(n, K) with coloring ρ belong to the class of Γ linguistic graphs considered in [8] (see also [15] , which observes cryptographical applications of linguistic graphs). The linguistic graph Γ defined over a commutative ring K is a bipartite graph with partition sets We use term symbolic point-to-point computation in the case of even k and talk about symbolic point-to-line computation in the case of odd k. We note that the computation C of each coordinate of v i via the variables x 1 , x 2 , …, x n and polynomials f 1 , f 2 , ..., f k needs only arithmetical operations of addition and multiplication. As it follows from the definition of linguistic graph the final vertex v k (point or line) has coordinates (h 1 (x 1 ), h 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), h 3 ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) , ..., h n (x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n )), where h 1 (x 1 ) = f k (x 1 ). Let us consider the map H = η(C): x i → h i (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, which corresponds to the computation C. Assume that the equation b = f k (x 1 ) has exactly one solution. Then the map H :
.., n, is a bijective transformation. In the case of finite parameter k and finite densities of f i (x 1 ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, the map H also has finite density. If all parameters deg(f i (x 1 )) are finite, then the map H has a linear degree in the variable n. Let us consider the totality ∑ = ∑(n, K) of point-to-point computations C with the symbolic key of kind f i (x 1 ) = x 1 + a i , i = 1, 2, ..., t, where the parameter t is even. In case of a linguistic graph with r = s = 1, we identify a computation C with the corresponding string (a 1 , a 2 , …, a t ). We assume that the empty string is also an element of ∑. The natural product of two strings given by tuples C 1 = (a 1 , a 2 , …, a t ) and a 2 , …, a t , b 1 + a t , b 2 + a t , …, b m + a t ) . This product transforms ∑ to a semigroup. The map η' sending C to η(C) is a homomorphism of ∑ into the affine Cremona group C(K n ). In the case of linguistic graphs A(n, K), we can prove that the totality G(n, K) = η′(∑(n, K)) is a stable subgroup of degree 3 (see [5] ).
We assume that a 0 = 0 and say that a transformation η(C) is irreducible, if a i ≠ a i+2 , i = 1, 2, ..., t-2. If a 1 ≠ a t-1 , and a 2 ≠ a t , we say that the irreducible computation C and the corresponding transformation η(C) are standard elements.
We have a natural homomorphism G(n + 1, K) onto G(n, K) induced by the homomorphism Δ from A(n + 1, K) onto A(n, K) sending a point (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n , x n + 1 ) to (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ) and a line [x 1 , x 2 , …, x n , x n + 1 ] to [x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ]. It means that there is the well-defined projective limit A(K) of graphs A(n, K) and groups G(K) of groups G(n, K), when n is growing to infinity. As stated in [6] in the case of K = F q , q > 2, the infinite graph A(F q ) is a tree.
It means that the group G(F q ) is a group of walks of even length on a q regular tree starting at the zero point with natural addition of them. A standard computation C defines a transformation η(C) in each group G(n, K), n 2 and G(K). An irreducible transformation η(C) from G(K) has an infinite order.
Some examples of a tame homomorphism were considered in [4] . We are going to use the family of maps introduced below.
Let Δ n, m, , n > m be a canonical homomorphism of A(n, K) onto A(m, K) corresponding to the procedure of deleting of the coordinates with indices m + 1, m + 2, …, n. This map defines the canonical homomorphism μ(n, m) of the group G(n, K) onto G(m, K).
Let R and K be finite extensions of a finite ring Q. Let us consider the diagram Alice forms π 1 = T 1 n 1 , where T 1 ∈ AGL 1n (K), n 1 ∈ H 1 , and π 2 = T 2 n 2 , where T 2 ∈ AGL 1m (R), n 2 ∈ H 2 . She takes a subgroup, where G1 pt = π 1 Gπ 1 
